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There is a war on, but only one side is armed: this is the es-
sence of the technology question today. On the one side is private
capital, scientized and subsidized, mobile and global, and now
heavily armed with military-spawned command, control, and com-
munication technologies. Empowered by the second Industrial
Revolution, capital is moving decisively now to enlarge and consoli-
date the social dominance it secured in the first ...
On the other side, those under assault hastily abandon the
field for lack of an agenda, an arsenal or an army. Their own com-
prehension and critical abilities confounded by the cultural bar-
rage, they take refuge in alternating strategies of appeasement and
accommodation, denial and delusion, and reel in desperate disarray
before this seemingly inexorable onslaught-which is known in po-
lite circles as "technological change."
-David F. Noble1
I.
Unemployment is something we can all grasp and under-
stand-and fear, too, for Homo sapiens has always been Homo faber
as well. People are significant in the eyes of others not so much for
what they are but for what they do. Meet someone for the first time at
almost any cocktail party and the inevitable question soon pops out:
"Where do you work?" or perhaps "What do you do?" In an ostensibly
classless society, one's occupation or vocation solidifies his status in so-
* Copyright 1984 by Arthur S. Miller. All rights reserved. This essay is based on
the author's work in progress, a book tentatively entitled Getting There From Here:
Constitutional Changes for a Sustainable Society.
** Adjunct Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law; Pro-
fessor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University.
1. Noble, Present Tense Technology, 3 DEMOCRACY No. 2, at 8 (1983).
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ciety. Work is the central factor of Western nations. Those who do not
work, unless they have been favored by fortune with inherited wealth,
are often scorned: They are called "welfare cheaters" or "bums." As
Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, Director of the London School of Economics, has
observed: "Labor at the center of society means that every aspect of
life must accommodate it-education, vacations, and retirement. In the
labor society education conforms to the discipline and demands of
work. Vacations serve as recovery periods, time to renew energies to
return to work refreshed. For progressive labor societies, at least, re-
tirement is a 'well earned rest after a lifetime of hard work.' "2 It is
beyond question that the United States has always been a "labor
society."
The essential question posed by the International Association of
Machinists (IAM's) "New Technology Bill of Rights" is how Ameri-
cans should adapt to the sudden end of such a society and its transmu-
tation into a society in which human labor has been largely eliminated.
The IAM believes that adaptation should not be left to chance or to the
vagaries of the "market." Theirs is a suggestion that affirmative gov-
ernmental action be taken to deal with a new situation in the human
condition. I will leave to others the question of the wisdom of the IAM
proposal. In this brief commentary I pose and seek to answer the ques-
tion of whether constitutional impediments exist that would bar the Bill
of Rights of the IAM from going into effect.
The short answer to that question is "no"-there is nothing in the
Constitution, as a document or as construed, that would invalidate
what the IAM proposes. Let me explain. I begin with several assump-
tions. First, the new technologies of microprocessing and computers
pose a clear and present danger to Homo faber. Mass man has become
obsolete, superfluous to the needs of the emergent politico-economic or-
der. Too many people are chasing too ,few jobs, a diminishing number
of jobs. No one quite knows what to do with surplus people, although
Professor Richard Rubenstein has developed some grim scenarios about
what might happen.3 Second, it is, as Jacques Ellul has maintained,
2. Dahrendorf, The End of the Labor Society, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, March
1983, at 28. Dahrendorf also says, "There is no cure for today's unemployment." Id.
3. R. RUBENSTEIN, THE AGE OF TRIAGE (1983); Rubenstein, The Elect and the
Preterite, 59 SOUNDINGS 357 (1976) (discussing "the rise of a mammoth, world-wide
superfluous population that can no longer emigrate to underpopulated regions of the
globe"). Rubenstein further comments:
[A]lthough Americans tend to regard technology as a means of solving
problems, the problem of surplus people in contemporary America is as
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"impossible to trust the spontaneous employment which men will make
of the available technical means." 4 The meaning is clear: positive ac-
tion should be taken to ameliorate the adverse consequences of new
technologies. Third, corrective action, should it come (which by no
means is certain), can derive only from government-the federal gov-
ernment. That is so because a holistic approach is indispensable, one
that encompasses the entire spectrum of man's position in nature and
his relationships with his fellow humans. No other societal institution is
capable even of considering, let alone undertaking, a program of com-
prehensive adaptation to what the scientists and technologists have
wrought.
I do not propose to prove those assumptions. They are self-evident,
and stated as givens in order to set the pattern for the ensuing brief
discussion of validity of one of the consequences of technological
change-the terminal sense of the loss of work itself by increasing
numbers of Americans (and others throughout the world). My net con-
clusion is that the advent of the new technologies requires a thorough
re-examination and reorganization of the political economy of the na-
tion-indeed, of the world. The New Technology Bill of Rights is a
proper step in that direction.
II.
The time has come for serious consideration to be given to the idea
that constitutions should be directed toward the reasonable satisfaction
of human needs and deserts, as well as merely establishing frameworks
of government and setting forth a set of negative limitations on what
government officers can do.5 What follows is in many respects a varia-
tion on a theme struck by Leon Duguit many years ago:6 "Any system
of public law can be vital only so far as it is based on a given sanction
to the following rules: First, the holders of power cannot do certain
things; second, there are certain things they must do." In recent de-
much the 'product' of technological rationality as are the automobile, the
computer and the nuclear bomb .... The threat of permanent economic
superfluity now confronts millions of American workers."
Id. at 358-59.
4. J. ELLUL, The Technological Order, in THE TECHNOLOGICAL ORDER: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA CONFERENCE 10, 25 (C. Stover ed. 1963).
5. This is the thesis of my book in progress, supra note *.
6. L. DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 26 (H. Laski translation 1919).
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cades, all three branches of the national government have risen in some
degree to confront Duguit's challenge. Congress has enacted numerous
statutes, the sum of which is to institutionalize the American version of
the welfare state. The Executive has cooperated, in greater or lesser
degree, by putting those legislative commands into operational reality.
And the Supreme Court has constitutionalized those efforts to meet the
"must do" part of Duguit's formulation. The requirement now it to
face up to the challenge posed by the IAM.
Since enactment of the IAM proposal would constitute a struc-
tural change in government, a basic alteration in what I have elsewhere
called the Political and the Economic Constitutions,7 purists might ar-
gue that if it is to come it should be by constitutional amendment.
That, however, is not necessary. Amendment at best is a ponderous
blunderbuss ill-suited to the requirements of a rapidly changing nation.
That, it be noted, has been true since at least 1791, when the Bill of
Rights was added to the Document drafted in 1787. Only the four-
teenth amendment may be said to be of supreme importance. The other
fifteen vary in significance from the repealed eighteenth to the nine-
teenth (voting rights for females); those of any consequence could have
been put into law by innovative congressional action pursuant to section
V of the fourteenth amendment.
We have become accustomed to and by and large agree with the
notion of judicial exegesis of the Constitution. However much some
may disagree with specific constitutional decisions by the Supreme
Court, there can be no question that the Justices do sit as a continuous
constitutional convention. They progressively update the fundamental
law. Each generation of Americans writes its own constitution, having
received a tacit delegation of powers from the framers to do so. (The
Supreme Court also received a tacit delegation of powers from those
who drafted the Document of 1787.) And the Constitution has always
been relative to circumstances. 8 It could scarcely be otherwise. Govern-
ment and law are more reflective of social conditions than determinants
of those conditions-at least historically. Law, including constitutional
law, is less a priori than a posteriori.
The new technology poses constitutional problems. Can they be
7. Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV.
633 (1983).
8. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGING CONSTITUTION
OF CONTROL passim (1981); A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL AcTIVISIM:
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982).
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met by means other than amendment? The answer can only be "yes,"
once it is perceived that the interpretation and development of the Con-
stitution is emphatically not a judicial monopoly. The myth system is to
the contrary: Under it, amendment or judicial exegesis are the only
legitimate ways to alter the fundamental law. But under the opera-
tional code of the American constitutional order the Constitution is
constantly in a state of becoming, altered not only by judicial decrees
but by certain legislative and executive acts.
A number of statutes can be viewed as "quasi-constitutional in na-
ture"; they sought to "clarify and define certain basic relationships
among the branches of government."9 At least the following statutes
fall into that category (although I see no reason to soften the label with
a "quasi"): the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
statute establishing the Federal Reserve Board, the Budget and Ac-
counting Act of 1921, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the
Employment Act of 1946, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the War Powers Resolution of 1973,
and the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. There may be
others, notably the National Security Act of 1947 and the National
Emergencies Act, but that listing clearly demonstrates that Congress
does indeed make constitutive decisions. Each of the statutes effected
something of a structural change in the nature of American govern-
ment; they delineate "structures and processes"'10 rather than setting
forth substantive policies.
As with Congress, so with the President: some of the Chief Execu-
tive's decisions or actions merit consideration as alteration of the Con-
stitution. The ready example is the warmaking power. Expressly vested
in Congress by Article I, and thus under the myth system solely a legis-
lative power, that notion was dealt a body blow by President Lincoln at
the beginning of the Civil War.1' Bit by bit since then-and even
before then-the White House has become the center of effective con-
trol over the use of violence. That is so even though Congress has
sought to retrieve some of its lost powers by the War Powers Resolu-
tion. Events since 1973 increasingly indicate that the Resolution is a
9. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 398 (10th ed.
1980).
10. Id. at 397.
11. For discussion, see C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948); Miller, Reason of State and the
Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MINN. L. REV. 585, 595-97 (1980).
1984] 519
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"paper tiger." 12 A constitutional shift of major proportions has taken
place.
By no means are Congress and the President always at logger-
heads. Many presidential actions, taken without express authority, get
at least tacit congressional approval through appropriations and other
means. Despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary, the norm be-
tween the branches is cooperation rather than conflict. Witness the
manner in which Congress routinely appropriated funds for waging a
presidential war in Vietnam. Witness also the establishment of the Na-
tional Security Agency by a still secret executive order. In both in-
stances, Congress did not dissent from presidential incursions on the
legislative turf. There is a further lesson: In general, the Supreme
Court goes along with congressional and executive constitutive deci-
sion-making. Examples are easily found: the Prize Cases, the Jones &
Laughlin decision sustaining the National Labor Relations Act, and
the brace of decisions upholding the Civil Rights Act.13 The Justices, as
Professor Martin Shapiro has commented, are part of the governing
coalition of the nation; and judicial independence exists more in the
myth system than in the operational code. 4
Enactment, therefore, of the IAM's proposed "New Technology
Bill of Rights" would embed into the law a statute that would ap-
proach the dimension of a constitutional amendment. It would basically
change the relationship of the workers to the "private" governments of
the nation, principally the supercorporations. There is nothing in the
proposal that would, under present doctrine, fail to pass constitutional
muster. A series of Supreme Court decisions beginning with the Gold
Clause Cases, passing through Jones & Laughlin and Katzenbach v.
McClung, and extending to United States v. Perez16 is proof positive
that existing law would validate what on first glance seems to be a
revolutionary proposal by the IAM. Given the requisite political will to
enact the proposal, it is wholly safe to forecast that the Supreme Court
12. For brief but insightful discussion, see Halperin, Declaring War, 9 FIRST
PRINCIPLES, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 12.
13. Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
14. M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 34
(1981).
15. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294;
Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 1; Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240
(1935).
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would not invalidate it. The persistent and unresolved problem, of
course, is how to generate that political will.
No one expects either House of Congress to rush forward in full or
even partial acceptance of the proposal. That it merits full considera-
tion, and soon, should go without saying. Call it Luddism if one wishes,
but the point is not that, but of determining who should bear, if indeed
anyone should, the dreadful costs of adapting to a new economy. It cuts
against the grain of the constitutional commitment to "equal justice
under law" to say that displaced workers should alone shoulder the
brunt of the loss of work itself.
III.
If it is assumed, as it should be, that Congress is far from likely to
enact anything remotely similar to the IAM's proposal, does that end
the matter? Not necessarily. But it would be enormously difficult to get
something substantial done. Again, let me explain.
I set aside the notion that any one or even a combination of the
several states could do the necessary. A company can play off one state
against another and choose the one that maximizes the firm's interests.
Furthermore, since under Wickard v. Filburn and Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung'6 there is very little of economic importance that does not fall
within the ambit of the federal government's power to govern com-
merce, the constitutional hurdle of unduly burdening interstate com-
merce would have to be surmounted. There is little reason to expect
that the present-day Supreme Court, dominated as it is by corporation
lawyers, would validate, say, an attempt by the state of Ohio to prevent
runaway plants or to ensure that corporations, once established in the
state, stay there. Profit maximization is the primary, if not the sole,
goal of corporate management. An effort by any one state to enact the
IAM proposal for companies doing business within that state would
certainly engender hostile opposition from the entire business commu-
nity. That hostility, in turn, is not likely to allow the state to prevail
before the Supreme Court when lawsuits are brought, as surely they
would. The pro-business attitude of today's Court is illustrated in, to
cite only one decision, First National Bank v. Bellotti. 7
16. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First
Amendment, 38 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 21 (1981); Wright, Money and the Pollution
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The ultimate need, if anything is going to be done, is for a great
national debate about the pros and cons of the new technology to take
place. How can it be started-and continued? "If there's ever gonna be
change in America, it's gonna be cause every community in America's
ready for it and-boom! There's gonna be a big tidal wave, and it's just
gonna crash down on Washington, and the people are finally gonna be
heard." 18 That "tidal wave" could create the necessary political will in
Congress. How can it be done? I venture, very tentatively and with full
cognizance of the inherent difficulties in the proposition, that the Su-
preme Court could, at least in theory, provide the catalyst for stimulat-
ing such a debate.
I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court should strive to
make decisions that maximize human dignity.19 Just as in Brown v.
Board of Education the Warren Court struck a blow for the decent
treatment of black Americans and in Roe v. Wade the Burger Court
carried on that theme (holding that women should have the right to
control their own bodies),20 so it is here: The Court arguably can help
in achieving a smoother transition to the new society that is fast be-
coming the norm. It, of course, would not be easy. But since both
Brown and Roe can be read as official statements that precipitated
great national debates (on race and abortion), it would not be a novel
proposition for the Supreme Court to do something similar about the
societal impact of technology. Two ways theoretically exist: first, the
Court could attempt to impose affirmative duties on Congress and the
President to take appropriate action concerning technology; and second,
the corporation could be constitutionalized by updating the "state ac-
tion" doctrine, followed by finding that workers-those willing and
able-had a constitutional right to a job (in general, but not a specific
job). I shall discuss each in turn, repeating at the outset the admonition
that the ideas are proffered only tentatively.
of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 609 (1982).
18. S. TERKEL, AMERICAN DREAMS LOST AND FOUND 312 (1981) (quoting a
community organizer). See generally S. BOWLES, D. GORDON, & T. WEISSKOPF, BE-
YOND THE WASTE LAND: A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE TO ECONOMIC DECLINE pas-
sim (1983).
19. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT ch. 11 (1982).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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A. Affirmative Duties on Government
I begin by acknowledging that for the Supreme Court to try to
impose affirmative duties on Congress and the President to deal prop-
erly and effectively with the impact of new technologies is not a partic-
ularly promising avenue to take. But it is worth exploring, even though
what immediately follows may be categorized as utopian thinking.
There is a value in such thinking,21 if only to encourage people to ele-
vate the level of their responses to new social conditions. The Supreme
Court has long acted as what Judge J. Skelly Wright once termed "the
conscience of a sovereign people." In recent decades-at least since
Brown v. Board of Education-the courts have become targets of pres-
sure groups, especially when the avowedly political branches of govern-
ment refuse or fail to act and deal with what are perceived by segments
of the citizenry as justified grievances.
Judicial interpretation (and enforcement) of affirmative duties of
government is by no means novel. In race relations, legislative reappor-
tionment, administration of the criminal law, and perhaps elsewhere, 2
obligations have been placed on governmental officers to do something
positive (as distinguished from refraining from not doing some-
thing-the time-honored ideal of constitutions as limitations on govern-
ment). Add the fact that since Cooper v. Aaron,23 and perhaps before,
it is widely accepted that the logically impossible has been by some
means known only to the Justices transmogrified into the possi-
ble-that a general principle can be inferred from one particular-and
it is apparent that the Court has indeed become a de facto third (and
perhaps highest) legislative chamber.
The argument, telescoped here,24 derives from (perhaps antedates,
although I know of no prior judicial statement) Chief Justice Charles
21. See W. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD ch. 2 (198). Professor
Galston maintains that utopian thought "performs three related political functions.
First, it guides our deliberation .... Second, it justifies our actions .... Third, it
serves as the basis for the evaluation of existing institutions and practices .... I am
convinced that no political theory that seeks to be practical can dispense with it." Id. at
14-15.
22. See Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 SuP. CT. REV.,
reprinted in A. MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S
EVOLVING CONSTITUTION ch. 5 (1979).
23. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class
Actions: A Comment on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L.
573 (1981).
24. For further discussion see A. MILLER, supra note 22, at chapters 4-5.
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Evans Hughes' opinion in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.25 There,
Hughes, dealing with the validity of a state's minimum wage legisla-
tion, said in part:
The principle which must control our decision is not in doubt.
The constitutional provision invoked is the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, governing the states, as the due process
clause invoked in the Adkins case governed Congress. In each case
the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage legislation
is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process
of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not
recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of
its phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty safe-
guarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the pro-
tection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is
thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regula-
tion which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in
the interests of the community is due process.
With that language, particularly the concluding two sentences, Hughes
changed the nature of liberty under the Constitution. "From being a
limitation on legislative power," Professor Edward S. Corwin ex-
plained, "the due process clause became an actual instigation to legisla-
tion of a leveling character."26 In effect, Hughes adopted without ac-
knowledgment Thomas Hill Green's concept of positive freedom and of
collective well-being. To Green, freedom meant "a positive power or
capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying. . .in
common with others." Freedom thus depends on the "help and secur-
ity" given by others, and which a person helps to secure for others.27 As
Chief Justice Hughes put it, the liberty protected by due process is in a
"social organization" that requires the protection of law against social
evils.
Do the deleterious second-order consequences of new technolo-
25. 300 U.S. 391 (1937).
26. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 161 (1948).
27. T. GREEN, Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in 3
WORKS OF THOMAS HILL GREEN 365, 371 (R. Nettleship ed. 1900). See M. PHILLIPS,
THE DILEMMAS OF INDIVIDUALISM: STATUS, LIBERTY, AND AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW passim (1983).
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gies-mainly unemployment-require "the protection of law?" The an-
swer can only be "yes." What can the Supreme Court contribute to the
fulfillment of that requirement? As all know, the Justices have identi-
fied new rights outside of the constitutional text, both historically (as in
liberty of contract), 28 and contemporaneously. Privacy is the ready ex-
ample here; but there are others.29 Can a similar right be created in the
economic sphere? As we have seen, there is already an explicit govern-
mental commitment to maximize employment and to further the eco-
nomic well-being of Americans, seen, for example, in the Employment
Act of 1946 and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978.
For the Supreme Court to do the necessary-to, that is, require
political action "reasonable in relation to its subject"-would necessi-
tate judicial innovation of a high level. The orthodox doctrine of judi-
cial power under the Constitution requires that there be a justiciable
controversy before courts can act. Some person, preferably someone out
of work and wanting a job, would seek a court decree mandating that
serious attention be accorded to employment security, followed by ac-
tion which would affirm "every worker's right to be employed with de-
cent wages at some job or another-but not necessarily always at the
same job.""0 Or, in the plaintive language of a retired policeman and
former marine, "I don't think our system is all bad. . . .What I object
to is, there's no planning, I don't care how much money it takes. They
should put every guy that wants to work, to work." ' The implication,
of course, is that there should be a constitutional right to a job.
Merely stating such an idea does violence to the accepted norms of
judicial behavior under the Constitution. But is the notion really so ex-
treme? I think not, although I readily concede that there is little au-
thority, as lawyers understand authority, to buttress it. To my knowl-
edge, the only Justice of the Supreme Court who ever suggested as
much is the late Justice William 0. Douglas, who in 1955 asserted in a
Supreme Court conference: "There is a constitutional right in this
country for a citizen to have a job. There is a constitutional right to be
a policeman or a lawyer." 32 (The second sentence was an attempted
28. Lochnar v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) is the locus classicus.
29. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1982).
30. S. BOWLES, D. GORDON, & T. WEISSKOPF, supra note 18, at 275.
31. Quoted in S. TERKEL, AMERICAN DREAMS LOST AND FOUND 232 (1981).
32. Quoted in B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL: WARREN AND His SUPREME
COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 184 (1983).
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refutation of the Holmes dictum, followed by his disciple Justice
Frankfurter, that "there was no constitutional right to be a police-
man.")3 3 The basic principle that would have to be established (in-
vented) is that the liberty protected by due process includes a right to a
job; or perhaps more concretely, that the citizenry have property rights
in jobs. Recognition of such a due process right, when viewed ab-
stractly, is certainly no more extreme or revolutionary than the Su-
preme Court's unexplained flash of revelation in 1886 that a corpora-
tion-a disembodied economic entity-was a person within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment; or, for that matter, the 1973
similar revelation that a woman could have an abortion by invoking a
right of privacy (which, incidentally, meant that the Justices refused to
recognize that a fetus is a constitutional person). This is said, be it
noted, not to take sides on either question, but simply to mention the
obvious: that the Justices have found rights lurking somewhere in the
interstices of the Constitution that could not possibly have been in the
minds of those who wrote and those who ratified the Document and its
amendments. The Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments are
statements of legally-concretized decency aimed at government and
designed to canalize its relationships with the populace. Or as Justice
Frankfurter observed in 1949: "It is of the very nature of a free society
to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right.
Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined
within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed
the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights. '3 4 So, I suggest it is
here. Judicial exegesis, and expansion, of the Constitution is routine, as
Justice Byron White stated in 1966 and Justice William Brennan in
1980.
Consider, for example, such cases as Wesberry v. Sanders, Powell
v. McCormack, and Buckley v. Valeo,3 5 each of which dealt with Con-
gress as either actual or tacit defendant. Consider, too, the spate of
recent decisions-the landmark case in United States v.
Nixon36-- which are judicial interventions into the area of presidential
power and discretion. Taken in their entirety, they evidence a growing
33. Id. The Holmes assertion may be found in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bed-
ford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
34. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
35. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
36. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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willingness of the Supreme Court to intervene in both the national leg-
islative and the executive processes. Wesberry, for example, told the
House of Representatives (via the state governments) how Representa-
tives had to be elected; and Nixon was an order to a sitting President to
act as an ordinary citizen in criminal law matters. Add to Nixon the
Steel Seizure Case,37 which was really directed toward President Tru-
man, and it can readily be seen that the Justices consider themselves to
be a constituent part of government, equal in title and equal in dignity
to the other branches. Judicial legislation has become a commonplace.
The sticking points in present context are, of course, the questions
of justiciability and of enforcement. As for the former, the Court would
have to take a mental leap and make what Frankfurter once called a
"logically arbitrary but sociologically nonarbitrary" decision to find a
constitutional case or controversy. Not that the method would be any-
thing novel: Justiciability has long been characterized by judicial fiat.
As in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,38 the "reasoning," such as it is, to
justify finding or not finding justiciability (standing, etc.) usually is cir-
cular. That is accepted, with little opposition, as proper judicial behav-
ior. If, then, the National Treasury Employees Union could succeed in
a suit against President Nixon to enforce a statutory responsibility,"9 it
would take no major extension of that principle for courts to find justi-
ciable controversies in present context. The point, to be sure, is debata-
ble and also controversial. After all, if the Court in the Weber case
could determine the "spirit" of the relevant statute,40 why could it not
further determine that the spirit of the Employment and Humphrey-
Hawkins Acts gave someone the requisite status to have their provi-
sions carried into effect?
Enforcement is quite another matter. There is no present way that
the Justices can do more than try to precipitate a great national debate
that would, sooner or later, end in political action. The Justices, how-
ever, have long been America's first faculty of political economy, a vital
national seminar in which the nation's values are often first debated
and articulated. Could that "seminar" discussion be raised to the level
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
38. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
39. National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
40. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-06 (1979) (up-
holding affirmative action plan, despite statutory language prohibiting basing employ-
ment decisions on race).
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of serious consideration of a constitutional right to a job? A tribunal
that rose to the challenge of rectifying long-standing practices of racial
discrimination, that created a constitutional right to an abortion, that
eliminated the "rotten boroughs" of the nation, that stared, down a sit-
ting President, and that revamped the administration of the criminal
law, surely is capable of dealing with the problem of how the economic
rights of workers are to be determined under the Constitution."
That, of course, is constitutional heresy. I do not expect ready
agreement (in any degree) with such a proposal. But the Court has
always been deeply immersed in politics. To Judge Spencer Roane of
Virginia the decision of the Supreme Court in Cohens v. Virginia42 was
heretical: "It can only be accounted for by that love of power which
history informs us infects and corrupts all who possess it, and from
which even the upright and eminent judges are not exempt." To Roane,
the Cohens decision was "most monstrous and unexampled."4 3 It was
heresy when I was in law school to assert that judicial action could be
state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, but the
Court took the plunge in Shelley v. Kraemer and Barrows v. Jackson.4
In like manner, Justice Hugo Black outraged Justice Felix Frankfurter
when he maintained in Adamson v. California that the fourteenth
amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights as a limitation on the states
as well as the federal government.4 5 As all know, Black's heresy has
now become the conventional wisdom. Consider, furthermore, the
firestorm of disapproval that erupted when the Court held in 1954 that
black Americans were entitled to decent treatment in the public
schools. Roe v. Wade received a similar reaction. The point is that the
Supreme Court may have decided some issues that turned out to be
"self-inflicted wounds"; 46 but even so, it has emerged from the fray
41. See generally A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE PO-
LITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982). A contrary view may be found in
Abraham, Book Review, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 477 (1983); Rabkin, The Charismat-
ic Constitution, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall, 1983, at 142.
42. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
43. See C. WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 555
(1926).
44. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953).
45. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
46. The term comes from C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 50 (1928). Hughes listed the Dred Scott decision, Dred Scott v. Sanford 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the legal tender cases, Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
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seemingly stronger than ever. (None of the cases listed immediately
above falls into a category of a self-inflicted wound. Dred Scott's
Case47 is perhaps the chief example of such judicial behavior.)
The need, as has been suggested, is to generate a national debate
on what should be done about the adverse second-order consequences of
new technologies. My thought in this subsection is that the Supreme
Court (courts generally) could play an important role in stimulating
that debate. That, however, does not mean that the Justices could not
act in another direction also. The focus of the next subsection concerns
judicial recognition of the fact that corporations are "private" govern-
ments, the important actors of the Economic Constitution, and as such
should have duties placed upon them.
B. Constitutionalizing the Corporations
That the United States is a corporate society is one of the com-
monplaces of the day. It has long been recognized that "voluntary pri-
vate associations" play an important role in social affairs. I should like
at this time to single out the business corporation-and of the corpora-
tions, the giant firms-for particular scrutiny. These companies domi-
nate the private sector of the nation. Economically, that sector is a
triad, consisting of the corporate economy (the giants), the small-busi-
ness economy (much of which is also incorporated), and the nonprofits.
Each part meshes with the others, but the giants-the supercorpora-
tions-are paramount, even though they are numerically much smaller.
Those gigantic companies not only straddle the nation but usually oper-
ate throughout the world. They set the tone for and greatly influence
the entire economy, government itself, and, indeed, all of society.
My thesis is that supercorporations are both economic entities and
sociopolitical organizations that exist midway between natural persons
and the state; as such, they should be perceived as "private" govern-
ments and held answerable to constitutional norms. They wield signifi-
cant social and political power, but their constitutional legiti-
macy-their right or title to govern-has only a tenuous base. Rather
457 (1871), and the income tax case, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S.
601 (1895) as "three notable instances [in which] the Court has suffered severely from
self inflicted wounds." F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970) claims that
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) was another such wound. He, contrary to
Hughes, is not persuasive.
47. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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like the way that Copernican astronomy superseded Ptolemaic cosmol-
ogy, supercorporations have so eroded the premises of both classical
economics and its political counterpart, liberal democracy, that new
theories must be devised. Economists have yet to explain or to justify
such massive conscious economic cooperation. So, too, with lawyers and
political scientists: the corporation's place in the constitutional system
is far from settled. A new political economy has emerged in the United
States in this century, but ancient and outmoded ideas of politics and
economics still abide. "We are living in tomorrow's world today, still
using yesterday's ideas."4
The preponderant social invention of the past century,
supercorporations today occupy a place in society comparable in impor-
tance and influence to the Holy Roman Church in medieval Europe.
With enormous assets, often running into tens of billions of dollars,
they are concentrations of non-statist economic, and therefore of politi-
cal, power not before known in human history. Corporate giants cannot
avoid influencing human lives the world over on a scale similar to, and
at times even dwarfing, public governments. Accordingly, Dr. Willis
Harman maintains, "they face a demand that has historically been
made only of government-that they assume responsibility for the wel-
fare of those over whom they wield power."49 The question in present
context is whether that demand for corporate responsibility can be ful-
filled through judicial action. Corporations have rights under the Con-
stitution. Do they have concomitant duties? Corporations are constitu-
tional persons. As such, do they have duties analogous to but not the
same as those that natural persons have?
I answer those questions affirmatively. More specifically, I suggest
that the Supreme Court could not only constitutionalize the corporation
but could, following Chief Justice Hughes in the Parrish case, require
that the giant firms develop policies that would include the welfare of
the workers (as well as that of the stockholders). Again, I do not expect
the present Court to leap to the challenge (save to shoot it down); but
certainly the time has come to recognize the true nature of the
supercorporations and do what is reasonably necessary about their un-
doubted power.
To bring the supercorporations within the ambit of the state action
concept requires no major leap of doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court
some years ago moved tentatively in that direction. But that movement
48. H. CLEVELAND, THE MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 15 (1979).
49. Harman, The Coming Transformation, THE FUTURIST, Fall 1977, at _.
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was halted with the appointment of the Nixonites to the High Bench,
so that today it surely is accurate to say, with Charles Black, that state
action is a "conceptual disaster area"; and with Christopher Stone that
it is "now, more than ever, a shambles." 50 The reason for such concep-
tual disarray is not difficult to locate: the Constitution was drafted on
the assumption that only two important juridical entities ex-
isted-government and the natural person-but during recent years the
United States has moved into what James Q. Wilson has called "the
bureaucratic state."5' Few judges know quite how to deal with the ad-
mitted economic power of disembodied economic entities. The state ac-
tion concept may have made some sense during the nineteenth century,
when society's groups were small and decentralized; the public-private
distinction, Morton Horwitz asserts, was "a rough approximation of re-
ality" in the last century.52 Today's world is different.
Marsh v. Alabama53 is still in the United States Reports. It exists
as a time bomb ticking away awaiting a time when lawyers and judges
can perceive the obvious: that the corporations, as the principal exem-
plars of the Economic Constitution, are indeed private governments.
There is no need to labor the point. The rise of the group and the emer-
gence of a corporate, an organizational society, is plain beyond doubt.
Constitutions, thus, should consider all-whether public or nominally
private-who exercise significant power in the socio-political arena.
Over that hurdle, then the application of constitutional norms to
purported private entities follows as a matter of course. The very con-
cept of constitutionalism arose a few centuries ago as a means of com-
batting the overweening power of the political sovereign. Today we
have both political and economic sovereigns, which are ever increas-
ingly joined together in a form of corporatism, and the same type of
thinking that contributed to the growth of constitutionalism should be
applied to all organizations that wield significant social power. Profes-
50. Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14,
81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967). Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do
Public/Private Distinctions Matter? 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1484 n.156 (1982). See
generally Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine (1984)
(forthcoming in a legal periodical).
51. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall
1975, at 77.
52. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423, 1428 (1982).
53. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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sor David Ewing of the Harvard Business School observed in 1977:1"
During the first two centuries of United States history, the
trend was unmistakably to broaden the reach of the Constitution.
Universal male suffrage, the abolition of slavery, bargaining rights
for unions, female suffrage, the many extensions of due process to
people under arrest or surveillance-these and many other events
marked the ever-widening application of the Constitution. But the
Constitution does not yet penetrate the organizational sector, the
still-dark ghetto of American rights.
Ewing advocates that corporations (organizations, generally) be sub-
jected to the limitations of an organizational bill of rights. He main-
tains that during America's third century, one of the hallmarks of con-
stitutionalism "should be concern for the rights of employees." 55
What, however, are those rights? Professor Ewing's call is basi-
cally one of bringing due process-procedural due process-to the
workplace. He makes a persuasive case. The question posed in this es-
say is whether that conception can be carried a step further-into the
realm of substantive due process. A generation ago the Vice-President
and General Counsel of the Ford Motor Company, William T. Gossett,
maintained that corporate management "no longer represents exclu-
sively the interests of stockholders. With the passage of time, it must
develop a variety of devices and procedures to assure that its dealings
with other groups are fair and just. '56 The other groups Gossett had in
mind were employees, suppliers, dealers, customers and plant commu-
nities, "each of which has a separate claim on the corporation. 57
What, then, is "fair and just"? And how can corporate manage-
ment be stimulated to do more than pursue the single-minded goal of
profit? Gossett tells us that there are conflicts of interest among the
various groups in the corporate community; and then goes on to make
this relevant statement:58
One of the most dramatic conflicts of interest revolves about
54. D. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION: BRINGING CIVIL LIBER-
TIES TO THE WORKPLACE 217-18 (1977).
55. Id. at 218. See Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corpo-
rate Beast, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79 (1979).
56. W. Gossett, Corporate Citizenship 178 (1957) (reprint from the John Ran-
dolph Tucker Lectures, 1953-1956, Washington & Lee University).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 187.
[Vol. 8
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/3
Note on Constitutionality
the decision of a large enterprise to move into a given community,
or out of it-particularly the latter. There have been numerous in-
stances where a single plant is the sole or major source of income
for an entire community, and a callous attitude toward the effects
of moving out could mean destruction for that community. The
narrow interests of efficiency and profit-making for the stockholder
might require such a move be made without delay. Yet the inter-
ests of local employees and the community might be so severely
prejudiced that the corporation could not in good conscience move
out without making every reasonable effort to mitigate the conse-
quence of its going.
The problem, thus, is that of catching the conscience of the economic
sovereigns-those who head the supercorporations. Courts are well
suited to take on that task. The principle involved can be easily stated:
Thou shalt not unreasonably harm members of the corporate commu-
nity. Or put in affirmative terms: corporate management's decisions
must take into consideration all segments of the corporate community,
not merely one (the stockholders).
Here, of course, is a legal no-man's land. But the moral principle
is clear, and can be translated into law by judicial decree. Consider, in
this respect, what the well-known corporate lawyer, Adolf A. Berle,
said in 1954:19
Power to deal at will with other men's property and occupa-
tion, however absolute it may be as a matter of technical contract
law, is subject to certain limitations. They still lie in the field of
inchoate law: we are not yet able to cite explicit case and statute
law clearly stating those limitations. We can only say that in this
field a matrix of equity jurisdiction is beginning to appear.
I do not wish at this time to do more than call attention to Berle's idea
of "inchoate law"; and then go on to suggest that in a few recent cases
the Supreme Court has, for the public sector at least, rendered a series
of decisions that evidence an emergent tendency-in Berle's language,
an "inchoate" tendency-toward finding a right to a job. In Elrod v.
Burns,60 for example, the Court held that a newly elected Democratic
sheriff could not fire some Republican employees simply because they
59. A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 82 (1954).
60. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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were members of another political party. And in Branti v. Finkel,"' the
Justices expanded the immunity of non-civil services employees from
patronage dismissals. Said Justice John Paul Stevens: "it is manifest
that the continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot
properly be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party in
control of the county government." In Perry v. Sindermann,2 a non-
tenured college professor alleged an interest in continued employment,
"though not secured by a formal contractual or tenure provision, was
secured by a no less binding understanding fostered by the college ad-
ministration. 63 Sindermann asserted that the "college had a de facto
tenure program, and that he had tenure under that program," and of-
fered to prove that he had "no less a 'property' interest in continued
employment than a formally tenured teacher" at colleges with a tenure
system. 4 Sindermann prevailed.6
Are those decisions harbingers of things to come? That, of course,
is possible but not probable. Other recent decisions, such as Board of
Regents v. Roth and Bishop v. Wood,6 point in a contrary direction.
The most that can be said is that the issue has not really been settled.
It is in flux. My position is that of Justice William Brennan in the
Bishop case: "There is certainly a federal dimension to the definition of
'property' in the Federal Constitution,16 7 a sentiment that Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the majority, called "remarkably innovative." Brennan
believed that state discharges implicated a constitutionally protected
liberty interest.
I believe that there is much to be said for the Brennan position.
That it has not yet commanded a majority, save in such decisions as
Elrod, Branti, and Sindermann, means that the Court is still searching
for a doctrine (or doctrines) that would control public employment situ-
ations. If the Elrod principle is carried over into the private govern-
ments of the nation, then something approximating a constitutional
right to a job would be in the making. Or if not a right to a job, at least
a right that, once hired, a person must not be treated arbitrarily.
61. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).Id. at 519.
62. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
63. Id. at 599.
64. Id. at 600.
65. Id. at 601.
66. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341 (1976). See generally Van Aistyne, Cracks in "The New Property: Adjudicative
Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977).
67. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 343.
[Vol. 8
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/3
Note on Constitutionality
IV.
A brief word by way of conclusion: The IAM proposal presents
critical questions about the nature of the American political economy. I
believe that Robert A. Dahl was correct when he recently observed that
"the commitment to corporate capitalism needs to be reconsidered.
Earlier, when the framers had discussed their fears about majorities
that might invade the rights of minorities, more often than not they
mentioned rights to property. Their reasoned justification of a right to
property, if they held one, would no doubt have been Lockean. Yet the
Lockean justificition makes no sense. . .when it is applied to the large
modern business corporation." 68 Historical capitalism is dying; of that
there can be little doubt. What will replace it is by no means certain at
this time. Capitalism today is ever increasingly collectivist in nature,
which means that its economic decisions Are made politically. It is not
a stable system, as the IAM proposal evidences. For that reason, and
perhaps for others, many nations today are moving toward nationaliza-
tion. State-owned companies are on the rise. Professors Monsen and
Walters tell us, throughout Western Europe.69 "European govern-
ments," they show, "now have a direct ownership stake in over half of
Europe's largest companies." Those firms, plus the more market-ori-
ented enterprises in the East, pose a direct challenge to American in-
dustry. How United States firms will react is one of the crucial politico-
economic-that is, constitutional-questions of the day. The rise of the
new economies will have to be met, in some form or another, by the
United States. I believe that the consequence will be a growing form of
an indigenous type of corporatism.70 If so, then the public-private dis-
tinction is on its way out. And it becomes all the more important that
proposals such as the "New Technology Bill of Rights" be given com-
prehensive and respectful attention by those who wield effective power
in America.
Finally: I do not wish to be placed in the position of using constitu-
68. Dahl, On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United
Statese, in BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE, 71, 90 (1. Howe ed. 1982).
69. R. MONSEN & K. WALTERS, NATIONALIZED COMPANIES: A THREAT TO
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1983).
70. See A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION passim (1976); Miller, Toward a Definition of
"The" Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 633, 691-700 (1983).
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tional arguments as a form of "desperate legal acrobatics."' 1 Surely,
however, the relationship of the populace-in present context, that of
the workers-to the public and private governments of the nation is an
important constitutional question. (Can someone name another that is
more important?) If the IAM proposal necessitates the complete re-
examination of the political economy of the nation, then such a scru-
tiny is long overdue. Furthermore, as Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes once observed, "Behind the words of the constitutional provi-
sions are postulates which limit and control. '72 One such postulate, I
suggest, is a surpassingly important human need: the need to be
needed. If the Constitution should, as has been suggested above, evolve
into one that fulfills human needs and human deserts within environ-
mental constraints, then the requirements of Homo faber should be
recognized and realized. Government, I maintain, has no other purpose
than to make every reasonable effort to see that human needs and
deserts are in fact satisfied. More specifically, if "our constitutional sys-
tem rests on a particular moral theory, that men have moral rights
against the state, '78 I maintain that high among those "moral rights"
is that of a constitutional right to a job.
71. Levinson, Book Review, 57 TEx. L. REV. 847, 858 (1979).
72. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1943).
73. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1977).
[Vol. 8536
22
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/3
